Key recommendations
- The EU must significantly increase and ringfence funding for democracy, civic participation, and media support (AgoraEU) within the MFF, ensuring resources match the scale of democratic threats;
- The EU must safeguard democracy as a European public good by limiting renationalisation through NRPRs and reinforcing EU-level oversight;
- Structural, predictable, and politically protected funding streams must be established to ensure CSOs can operate independently across all Member States;
- The EU must require all NRPRs to include a dedicated and sufficiently funded budget line for local democratic actors, including municipalities, NGOs, and regional media;
- Strengthening rule-of-law conditionality requires clearer enforcement criteria, faster procedures, and depoliticised decisions on suspending or restoring EU funds;
- The EU must enable direct EU funding to municipalities, independent institutions, and civil society when national governments undermine democratic standards;
- Substantially increased funding is needed for independent journalism, journalist protection, cross-border media cooperation, and local and regional media resilience;
- The EU must establish and ringfence stable, multiannual funding for an independent European Centre for Democratic Resilience to coordinate action against disinformation and FIMI.
Introduction
Europe enters the next budgetary cycle at a moment of democratic vulnerability. Across the Union, foreign interference, disinformation, threats from within the Union and growing pressure on civil society organisations and independent media are undermining public trust, distorting political debate and public opinion, and weakening democratic participation. These threats are no longer marginal. They affect elections, social cohesion, and the very foundations of the European project.
As negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034 begin, the EU must recognise democratic resilience as a strategic priority on a par with security, competitiveness, and climate action. The next EU budget must become a pillar of democratic defence, ensuring that civic space is protected, independent media can thrive, foreign interference is countered, and the rule of law and fundamental rights are upheld across all Member States.
Adjust the Structure and Scale to Reflect Today’s Challenges
The Commission presents the next MFF as the most ambitious in history, with an effective volume of around €1.82 trillion, which, however, accounts for only around 1.15% of EU’s gross national income (GNI). Yet ambition cannot be measured in headline figures alone. What matters is whether the structure and priorities of the budget match the scale of the challenges Europe faces today.
From the perspective of democratic resilience, the proposal does not rise to the challenge. While threats to democracy, information integrity, and civic space are intensifying every day, funding for these areas remains marginal, fragmented, and vulnerable to political compromise. In its draft proposal for the 2028–2034 MFF, the Commission introduces AgoraEU, a new programme bringing together EU support for culture, media, and civil society. AgoraEU merges Creative Europe, CERV, and existing media instruments into three strands: Creative Europe – Culture, MEDIA+, and CERV+.
While this consolidation is presented as a simplification for beneficiaries, it carries a clear risk of reducing the funding opportunities and increasing competition as well diluting the distinct objectives and impact of each programme, thereby weakening effective support overall. Thus, strong ringfencing for the different spending lines is of utmost importance. The total allocation for AgoraEU amounts to €8.6 billion, including €3.6 billion for CERV+, €1.8 billion for Creative Europe – Culture, and €3.2 billion for Media+. This represents an increase compared to the combined allocations for Creative Europe (€2.44 billion) and CERV (€1.55 billion) in 2021–2027 and is thus welcomed. However, it remains wholly insufficient considering the scale and severity of the democratic challenges facing Europe. Taken together, AgoraEU accounts for just 0.25 percent of the total MFF. This starkly illustrates a persistent mismatch between the scale of the threat to European democracy and the resources allocated to defend it. By continuing to treat democracy funding as marginal, the proposal risks reinforcing a dangerous imbalance in which economic and security priorities are expanded, while the foundations of democratic life are left underfunded and exposed.
Moreover, the growing reliance on National and Regional Partnership Plans (NRPRs) risks renationalising policies that must remain firmly anchored at the EU level. Democracy, rule of law, media freedom, and civil society protection are European public goods. They cannot depend on fluctuating national political will. The next MFF must therefore reassert the EU’s role as a guarantor of democratic standards and values.
Protect Civic Space and Civil Society
Across Europe, civil society organisations are facing shrinking space, political pressure, and hostile rhetoric that undermines their legitimacy. From restrictions on funding to smear campaigns portraying NGOs as “foreign agents” or political enemies, civic actors increasingly operate in an environment of insecurity. This trend directly weakens democratic participation and erodes the social fabric that sustains pluralism and accountability.
Yet the Commission’s MFF proposal risks compounding these challenges. The shift toward larger, merged funding instruments and greater reliance on national envelopes threatens to dilute EU-level support for civil society and make it more dependent on domestic political dynamics. In several Member States, this would place organisations working on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in an even more precarious position. To counter these threats, the EU must take a clear political stand. Support for civil society cannot be discretionary or symbolic. It must be structural, predictable, and protected from political interference. This requires, first, the strengthening of EU-level democracy funding streams and, second, a firm safeguard within the new budget architecture.
We therefore call for a binding requirement that every NRPRs includes a dedicated and sufficiently funded budget line for supporting civil society in the respective Member State. Furthermore, we ask that within this budget line funds be earmarked for local democratic actors, such as municipalities, local and regional media, local activists and NGOs, who are first in line – and often underfunded – to respond to the threats on democracy. Such an obligation would ensure that civic space is protected across the Union, not only where national governments are willing. It would guarantee that organisations defending fundamental rights, democratic participation, and the rule of law can operate even in adverse political environments. This is not only a matter of fairness; it is a matter of democratic security.
Reinforce the Rule of Law and Democratic Safeguards
The Commission proposes to strengthen the link between EU funding and respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights. This proposal goes in the right direction. However, without clearer enforcement mechanisms and stronger political resolve, conditionality risks remain largely symbolic. Experience shows that slow procedures, political bargaining, and inconsistent application have weakened the credibility of existing tools. In some cases, funds have continued to flow to governments that openly challenge judicial independence, media freedom, and civil society. This undermines not only the Union’s values but also public trust in the EU’s capacity to defend them.
The next MFF must move from cautious conditionality to effective democratic safeguards. This means clarifying the criteria for linking funding to rule of law breaches, depoliticising decisions on suspending or restoring funds, and accelerating procedures when democratic backsliding occurs. It also means ensuring that citizens are not punished for the actions of their governments. Where national authorities undermine EU values, the Commission should be empowered to channel funding directly to municipalities, independent institutions, and civil society organisations that uphold them. Democracy must be defended not only at the level of principles, but through concrete financial and institutional support for those who keep it alive.
Support Media Freedom, Fight Disinformation and FIMI
Independent journalism and pluralistic media are the cornerstone of democratic life. Yet across Europe, media outlets face mounting economic pressure, political interference, and growing exposure to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). In this context, the Commission’s proposal to allocate €3.2 billion to the Media+ strand under AgoraEU, representing only around 0.16 percent of the total EU budget, falls dramatically short of what is needed.
Disinformation, information manipulation, and hostile foreign influence are now systemic threats to independent media, and to their ability to fulfil their role as watchdogs fighting for transparency and accountability. Treating media support as a marginal policy area sends a dangerous signal that the EU underestimates the strategic importance of its democratic information space. The EU must adopt a far more ambitious approach. Funding for investigative journalism, cross-border media cooperation, local and regional media, and journalist safety must be significantly increased. This includes both physical protection and digital security against surveillance, hacking, and harassment. At the same time, media freedom should be embedded within a broader European democratic security strategy. Protecting the integrity of public debate is inseparable from protecting elections, countering hybrid threats, and safeguarding Europe’s sovereignty in the digital sphere. A resilient media ecosystem is not only a cultural good; it is a strategic necessity.
FIMI has become one of the defining threats to Europe’s democratic systems with hostile actors actively exploiting Europe’s open societies to weaken trust and polarise debate. Therefore, the Commission’s proposal for a European Centre for Democratic Resilience under the European Democracy Shield (EUDS), whose main task is to support operational cooperation in countering FIMI and disinformation, is timely and necessary. However, without a clear mandate, strong independence, and stable funding, the centre risks becoming a symbolic gesture rather than a transformative instrument. To be effective and trusted, the centre must be established as an independent, multi-stakeholder hub bringing together EU institutions, Member States, academia, independent media, civil society, and candidate countries. Its mission should support national and local capacity-building and fostering cross-border cooperation in democratic defence. Crucially, the centre must be firmly anchored in the MFF with stable, multiannual funding. This funding must be ringfenced and linked both to democracy instruments such as CERV+ and to the EU’s broader security and defence architecture. Democratic resilience cannot be treated as separate from Europe’s security strategy. In today’s geopolitical reality, they are two sides of the same coin. It is this understanding that must guide the creation of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience.
Conclusion
The next MFF will shape the European Union’s trajectory in an era defined by geopolitical rivalry, technological disruption, and democratic contestation. The Commission’s proposal offers a starting point, but it does not yet rise to the level of the crisis we face.
If Europe is serious about defending its democratic model, it must back its words with resources, structures, and political courage. This means scaling up funding for civil society and independent media, enforcing the rule of law with consistency, countering foreign interference with determination, and embedding democratic resilience at the heart of the EU budget. Investing in democracy is not a luxury. It is the foundation on which Europe’s security, prosperity, and unity depend.
For more detailed policy positions on the above themes, please click HERE.
