Key recommendations

• The EU must use the ECF to strengthen defence and space capabilities through European Defence Projects of Common Interest, cross-border industrial partnerships, and investment across the full defence innovation cycle;
• Defence spending must be guided by joint capability planning, interoperability standards, and coordinated procurement to avoid duplication and fragmentation across Member States;
• The EU must deploy diversified financial instruments to accelerate defence innovation, while prioritising cross-border consortia, common standards, and fair access for SMEs and emerging defence ecosystems;
• Systematically integrating lessons from Ukraine’s battlefield experience and strengthening cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry is essential;
• The EU must treat military mobility as a core pillar of European defence preparedness by significantly scaling investment in dual-use transport, energy, and digital infrastructure;
• Eliminating cross-border infrastructure bottlenecks, harmonising standards, and strengthening cybersecurity and interoperability are essential to ensure rapid and coordinated deployment capabilities;
• The EU must integrate cybersecurity and preparedness funding into a broader democratic security strategy, addressing hybrid threats targeting institutions, public trust, and social cohesion;
• Strengthening civic resilience requires increased support for civil society, media literacy, independent journalism, and enforcement of digital legislation to counter disinformation and foreign interference;
• The EU must maintain sustained, predictable, and long-term military, financial, and industrial support for Ukraine as a central pillar of European security and deterrence;
• Defence support must be balanced with strong investment in humanitarian aid, reconstruction, democratic governance, and accession-related reforms to secure sustainable peace and stability.

Introduction

Europe’s security environment has entered a period of structural instability that will shape the coming decade. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the increasing use of hybrid and cyber warfare, pressure on critical infrastructure, and intensifying global power competition have made clear that peace and security in Europe can no longer be taken for granted. At the same time, the continued deterioration of the security situation in the Middle East has direct repercussions for Europe, amplifying risks linked to regional spillover, energy security, migration and broader geopolitical instability, and placing additional demands on the Union’s security, defence and diplomatic posture. Tensions in transatlantic relations have recently intensified, particularly due to the Trump administration’s explicit challenges to the sovereignty of Greenland and Europe as a whole, and its open hostility towards the European project and its values. This has exposed the fragility of the long-standing assumption that Europe can rely on external actors to defend it indefinitely.

In this context, the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2028–2034 is a test of whether the European Union is willing and able to assume responsibility for its own security. The MFF must provide the financial, industrial and governance foundations for Europe to defend itself, protect its citizens, and preserve its democratic way of life. Security and defence are no longer peripheral policy areas; they are essential European public goods that require collective investment, strategic coordination and democratic legitimacy.

The European Competitiveness Fund: the backbone of EU defence investment

The European Competitiveness Fund (ECF) will be the European Commission’s main vehicle for strengthening Europe’s security and defence capabilities. Its Resilience, Security, Defence Industry and Space policy window commands over half of the programme’s budget, earmarking approximately €131 billion for defence and space — a fivefold increase compared with the current MFF.

Through the ECF, the EU aims to fund European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI), support cross-border industrial partnerships, and accompany the full investment journey from research and development to prototyping, testing, qualification and procurement. The fund also seeks to reinforce defence production capacities, including through “ever-warm” manufacturing facilities, promote dual-use technologies and strengthen space–defence synergies as part of Europe’s strategic autonomy.

Targeted eligibility criteria favouring European-made products, components and suppliers can help build a more resilient and sovereign defence industrial base. However, the effectiveness of this approach will depend on strategic coherence. Without a shared European defence plan, increased funding risks reinforcing national silos, duplicating weapons systems and perpetuating inefficiencies that have long undermined Europe’s defence readiness. Joint capability planning, interoperability requirements and coordinated procurement must therefore guide EU-level defence spending.

A key feature of the proposed MFF is greater flexibility across the budget, allowing the EU to act and react rapidly when circumstances change or new priorities emerge. Recent crises have demonstrated the necessity of such flexibility in the security and defence domain. However, flexibility must be matched by strong democratic safeguards. Clear governance frameworks, transparent decision-making, regular reporting to the European Parliament and national parliaments, and robust post-expenditure controls are essential to ensure accountability. Public trust in increased defence spending depends on the assurance that flexibility does not come at the expense of fairness, oversight or democratic control.

Innovation, industry and European added value

The Commission proposes using a mix of financial tools — including grants, equity, debt instruments and procurement — to support innovation across the defence sector and improve access to finance for start-ups and SMEs. This diversified approach has the potential to crowd in private investment and accelerate technological development in critical areas such as air defence, drones, cyber-defence and space. To deliver genuine European added value, these instruments must prioritise cross-border consortia, common standards and shared industrial ecosystems. Safeguards are needed to prevent subsidy races and uneven benefits between Member States, particularly given differences in industrial capacity and research intensity. Ensuring fair access for SMEs, start-ups and less-developed defence ecosystems is essential for maintaining cohesion and political support.

Learning systematically from Ukraine’s battlefield experience should also inform European capability development. Supporting Ukraine’s defence industry and integrating relevant expertise into EU programmes contributes directly to Europe’s own security and readiness.

Military mobility, preparedness and dual-use infrastructure

The proposal to multiply the military mobility strand of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) by ten marks a decisive recognition that Europe’s security depends not only on defence capabilities, but on the ability to deploy them rapidly and coherently across the Union. The capacity to move troops, equipment and supplies efficiently across borders is a core element of deterrence, crisis response and collective defence, particularly in a security environment where reaction time can be decisive.

Investment in military mobility should therefore be treated as a central pillar of European preparedness. Dual-use transport, energy and digital infrastructure strengthen defence readiness while also delivering tangible civilian benefits, from more resilient supply chains to improved connectivity in border and peripheral regions. These investments contribute directly to Europe’s ability to respond to military crises, hybrid threats, natural disasters and large-scale emergencies without relying on external actors.

To maximise impact, military mobility funding must focus on eliminating cross-border bottlenecks, harmonising standards, and improving interoperability between national systems. This includes ensuring that infrastructure is built to withstand hybrid and cyber threats, with strong cybersecurity requirements for transport networks, logistics hubs and digital control systems. Close coordination between military mobility funding, defence industrial investment and civil protection instruments is essential to build a genuinely integrated European preparedness architecture, rather than a collection of fragmented sectoral initiatives.

Cybersecurity, hybrid threats and democratic resilience

The MFF proposal includes a significant boost for cybersecurity, preparedness and dual-use infrastructure across several instruments, notably through the Resilience, Security, Defence Industry and Space window of the European Competitiveness Fund (with €131 billion earmarked for defence and space), a tenfold increase in military mobility funding under the Connecting Europe Facility, and reinforced resources for civil protection and crisis preparedness, including a fivefold increase of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism to €10.7 billion. While protecting networks and systems is essential, hybrid threats increasingly target democratic processes, social cohesion and public trust. Preparedness in this context must go beyond technical readiness. Sauli Niinistö’s report ‘Safer together: A path towards a fully prepared Union’, underlines that a society’s resilience depends on citizens’ trust in their democratic institutions and in the political communities they belong to — and in the belief that these are worth protecting.

EU cybersecurity and preparedness funding must be understood in a broader security context. Defending Europe today means protecting not only networks, data and critical infrastructure, but also societies and democratic institutions from hybrid threats that deliberately exploit distrust, social fragmentation and information manipulation. While investment in cyber capabilities and innovation are essential, it is not sufficient on its own: without strong democratic processes and informed citizens who trust public institutions, technical defences cannot prevent disinformation, foreign interference or societal destabilisation.

This makes the role of civil society strategically indispensable. Organisations engaged in defending democracy are not only contributors to civic life, but active actors in Europe’s security and preparedness architecture. By promoting pro-democracy narratives, strengthening media literacy, countering disinformation and fostering civic engagement, they help sustain public trust, reinforce social cohesion and build resistance to efforts aimed at destabilising societies and undermining confidence in democratic institutions. To fulfil this role effectively, such organisations must be adequately resourced and equipped with the financing, tools and long-term capacity needed to operate at scale and respond rapidly to evolving hybrid threats. EU cybersecurity funding should therefore be designed to strengthen societal cohesion and civic resilience alongside technical capabilities, including sustained investment in media literacy, counter-disinformation, independent journalism, civic education, support for civil society and robust enforcement of EU digital legislation such as the Digital Services Act, the Digital Markets Act, the European Media Freedom Act and the AI Act.

This need is particularly urgent in light of European Movement International’s June 2025 polling, which shows that only 36% of respondents can be considered consistent supporters of democracy.  Societies where democratic trust is weak are more vulnerable to manipulation and hybrid attacks. Defending Europe in the digital age therefore requires protecting not only infrastructure and data, but also democratic trust, civic space and the information environment on which Europe’s security and resilience ultimately depend.

Ukraine and the balance between hard and soft power

Support for Ukraine is inseparable from Europe’s own security. Russia’s war of aggression is not only an attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty, but a direct challenge to the European security order. A Ukrainian defeat would fundamentally weaken Europe’s strategic position, increase instability along the EU’s borders and embolden further aggression against neighbouring countries. The Commission’s MFF proposal explicitly recognises this reality by treating support for Ukraine as a long-term strategic priority rather than a short-term external policy response.

The proposed framework foresees sustained and predictable EU support for Ukraine, including a dedicated financial envelope outside the MFF ceilings, continued assistance under the Global Europe instrument, and reinforced off-budget defence support through the European Peace Facility. Together, these elements provide a basis for ongoing military assistance, defence-related industrial cooperation, and investments that strengthen Ukraine’s resilience, including in areas such as energy security, cyber-defence, infrastructure and preparedness. This integrated approach reflects the understanding that Ukraine’s capacity to resist aggression directly contributes to Europe’s own defence and deterrence.

At the same time, the MFF proposal reflects the expectation that military support be complemented by diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and support for democratic governance. Funding under Global Europe is designed to support Ukraine’s recovery, institutional resilience and accession-related reforms, while preserving the principles and quality of Official Development Assistance. Maintaining this balance is essential for Europe’s credibility and long-term security. Strengthening defence capabilities and supporting Ukraine militarily must therefore go hand in hand with robust investment in humanitarian aid, development cooperation, human rights and democratic resilience, ensuring that immediate security needs reinforce — rather than undermine — sustainable peace and stability.

The economic and military threats made by Donald Trump towards Greenland, and thus against Denmark’s territorial sovereignty, must be unequivocally condemned. They underscore that challenges to European security and democratic norms are no longer confined to the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. The next MFF must therefore be sufficiently flexible and robust to respond to such contingencies, including potential escalation affecting EU Member States or their territories. As with Ukraine, the Union’s capacity to act decisively in defence of democracy, sovereignty and the rule of law will be a defining test of its credibility and strategic autonomy.

Conclusion

The Commission’s proposal for the next MFF marks an important step towards recognising security and defence as central EU priorities. The scale-up of defence investment, the creation of the European Competitiveness Fund and the emphasis on flexibility provide a necessary foundation for a more secure Europe.

Yet funding alone will not guarantee security. Europe’s defence depends on strategic coherence, unity among Member States, democratic legitimacy and the confidence of citizens. The next MFF must enable the EU not only to respond to crises, but to defend itself, reduce dependencies and uphold its democratic values in an increasingly uncertain world.

A credible, autonomous and strategically focused European security budget is now indispensable. The choices made in the coming negotiations will shape Europe’s capacity to protect its people, its sovereignty and its democratic future.

For more detailed policy positions on the above themes, please click HERE